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Conceptualizing Climate Justice in Kivalina 
Marissa Knodel* 
Due to climate change, indigenous communities in Alaska are 
forced to develop in ways that adversely affect their livelihoods and cul-
ture. Decreases in sea ice, increases in the frequency of sea storms, and 
melting permafrost have accelerated erosion of the barrier island on 
which the village of Kivalina sits to the point where relocation is neces-
sary. It is unjust that communities like Kivalina have contributed little to 
causing climate change but are limited in their ability to adapt. 
This Article examines three broad questions and comes to four pre-
liminary conclusions about relocation as a climate adaptation strategy 
and its relation to climate justice. First, how are climate-induced impacts 
understood among indigenous communities in Alaska? Second, how 
does relocation affect a community’s ability to adjust to climatic chang-
es? Third, how can community participation be increased in discussions 
about, and policies for, relocation? Specifically, do discussions about 
climate justice help or hinder the relocation process? My preliminary 
conclusions are that first, climate-induced impacts are symptomatic of 
ongoing social-historical processes that produce vulnerability and limit 
adaptive capacity. Second, by taking these processes into account, cli-
mate-induced relocation can benefit from utilizing local, indigenous 
knowledge and increasing community participation in relocation plan-
ning. Third, if relocation is viewed as contributing to community resili-
ence, new opportunities to empower communities and collaborate with 
state and federal agencies are possible. Finally, reframing relocation as a 
climate justice issue broadens the discussion to include both its environ-
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mental and social-historical drivers, and draws connections between is-
sues of climate change, sovereignty, and cultural survival.1  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Lucy Adams, a Kivalina elder, appeared resigned to a future be-
yond her control. The corners of her mouth turned down as she sighed, 
gazed up at the ceiling as if she was looking through it into an uncertain 
future, and said, “We are standing alone to try and survive.”2 After a 
moment of solemn silence, I asked her to tell me a story about resilience. 
Her mood changed as she smiled and began: 
Thirty years ago, we built sod igloos. Men would get wood with 
dog teams. The dogs would pull the boat out onto the ice. Women 
would run alongside the dogs. I would run for hours and hours and 
never get tired. Everything was so clean. Clean water, clean fish. 
We burned trash. There were no plastic bags. We washed clothes by 
hand. If we ran out of wax candles, we used seal blubber. Every-
body worked and exercised every day.3 
Lucy’s narrative may sound like a depiction of an idealized past, but it 
stands in stark contrast to the Kivalina of today. According to the 2010 
U.S. Census, Kivalina has a total population of 374 living in eighty-five 
housing units on an eight-mile barrier island in the Chukchi Sea, eighty 
miles above the Arctic Circle in northwest Alaska.4 Decreases in sea ice, 
increases in the frequency of sea storms, and melting permafrost have 
accelerated erosion of the island to the point where relocation is neces-
sary. The rise in public attention to climate-induced relocation and the 
desire to document the phenomenon has led to an inundation of indige-
nous communities in Alaska with journalists, photographers, scientists, 
lawyers, and politicians eager to engage with “America’s first climate 
change refugees.”5 Media and official reports present the need for reloca-
                                                        
 1. In Kivalina, community members shared with me their memories, thoughts, and visions of 
their future through stories. Stories are often constructed to draw out some sort of lesson or moral to 
inform future research and/or political action. Conscious of this research bias, my research team 
frequently discussed how to define our research question when conducting interviews in Kivalina. 
When we spoke with community members, we attempted to listen more than ask, and began our 
conversations by asking about contemporary life in Kivalina, how it differs from the past, and what 
the future portends. We found this approach elicited greater dialogue about not just loss and uncer-
tainty, but resiliency and hope in the relocation and recreation of home. 
 2. Interview with Lucy Adams, in Kivalina, Alaska (Oct. 26, 2012). 
 3. Id. 
 4. 2010 Demographic Profile: AK-Kivalina ANVSA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www. 
census.gov/popfinder/?fl=6755 (last modified Aug. 6, 2013). 
 5. Carol Kuruvilla, Climate Change Will Cause Alaskan Village to Vanish under Water Within 
10 Years: Scientists, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 30, 2013), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ 
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tion as a direct result of climate change, yet climate change is both an 
“ecological phenomenon” as well as “an abstract idea with multiple 
meanings and possible interpretations, according to the context of its 
enunciation.”6 The meanings, interpretations, and enunciation—the dis-
course—of climate change, and the particular vulnerability of indigenous 
communities in Alaska to its impacts, influence both adaptive and con-
frontational responses, in particular, relocation and litigation. In the case 
of Kivalina, even though lack of developable space instigated the reloca-
tion process, climate change has brought renewed attention to the issue 
by making visible the village’s particular vulnerability and limited adap-
tive capacity. 
The increased visibility of Kivalina and the policies driving its 
“motionless relocation” raise questions about responsibility and justice.7 
The federally recognized Native Village of Kivalina and the state-
recognized city of Kivalina (collectively “Kivalina”) boldly entered the 
climate justice discourse in 2008 when it filed a lawsuit against nearly 
two dozen energy and utility companies for damages to aid in the reloca-
tion process, based on the argument that the defendants bear the greatest 
responsibility for climate change.8 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit dismissed the case in October 2012, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court declined to hear the case.9 These legal hurdles, however, did not 
end the dialogue about how Kivalina’s relocation should proceed and the 
implications for community resiliency. 
The terms adaptation, adaptive capacity, vulnerability, and resilien-
cy are utilized and understood in this Article to be interrelated and appli-
cable to a variety of disciplines, scales, and contexts. The United Nations 
Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR) defines adaptation as the 
“adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or ex-
pected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits 
beneficial opportunities.”10 In the context of climate change, adaptation 
can be considered “local or community-based adjustments to deal with 
changing conditions within the constraints of the broader economic-
                                                                                                                            
national/alaskan-village-vanish-water-decade-scientists-article-1.1412920#commentpostform. 
 6. Patrick Durrer, “Global Warming Issues are Here”: Ethnography of a Motionless Reloca-
tion in Kivalina, Alaska, EUROPEAN SCI. FOUND., 18 (May 13, 2011), 
http://doc.rero.ch/record/21621/files/memoire_Durrer.pdf. 
 7. Id. at 2. 
 8. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 9. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 2390 (May 20, 2013). 
 10. Terminology, UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION (Aug. 30, 2007), 
http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology. 
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social-political arrangements.”11 Hence, adaptive capacity involves the 
“strengths, attributes[,] and resources available within a community, so-
ciety or organization” to adjust to climatic stimuli, their effects, or both.12 
UNISDR defines vulnerability as the “characteristics and circumstances 
of a community, system or asset that make[s] it susceptible to the damag-
ing effects of a hazard.”13 In contrast, resilience is the “ability of a sys-
tem, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accom-
modate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and effi-
cient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its 
essential basic structures and functions.”14 
The impacts of climate change exacerbate Kivalina’s vulnerability 
and, consequently, reduce its adaptive capacity. To answer how Kivalina 
might improve its adaptive capacity to the point of resilience, the specific 
characteristics and circumstances of Kivalina’s vulnerability must be 
identified. Community-based vulnerability assessments require the “ac-
tive involvement of stakeholders, considerable effort to ensure legitima-
cy, information collection on community relevant phenomena and pro-
cesses, the integration of information from multiple sources, and the en-
gagement of decision-makers.”15 An effective adaptation strategy will 
acknowledge and attempt to reduce community vulnerability throughout 
its development and execution. 
This Article examines three broad questions and comes to four pre-
liminary conclusions about relocation as a climate adaptation strategy 
and its relation to climate justice. First, how are climate-induced impacts 
understood among indigenous communities in Alaska? Second, how 
does relocation affect a community’s ability to adjust to climatic chang-
es? Third, how can community participation be increased in discussions 
about, and policies for, relocation? Specifically, do discussions about 
climate justice help or hinder the relocation process? My preliminary 
analysis based on fieldwork and literature review suggests several con-
clusions. First, climate-induced impacts are symptomatic of ongoing so-
cial-historical processes that produce vulnerability and limit adaptive 
capacity. Second, by taking these processes into account, climate-
induced relocation can benefit from utilizing local, indigenous 
                                                        
 11. Barry Smit & Johanna Wandel, Adaptation, Adaptive Capacity and Vulnerability, 16 
GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 282, 289 (2006). 
 12. Terminology, supra note 10. 
 13. Id. A “hazard” is a “dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that 
may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and ser-
vices, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage.” See id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Smit & Wandel, supra note 11, at 288. 
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knowledge and increasing community participation in relocation plan-
ning. Third, if relocation is viewed as contributing to community resili-
ence, new opportunities to empower communities and collaborate with 
state and federal agencies are possible.  Finally, reframing relocation as a 
climate justice issue broadens the discussion to include both its environ-
mental and social–historical drivers, and draws connections between is-
sues of climate change, sovereignty, and cultural survival. 
Climate change exacerbates existing social vulnerabilities. In Part II 
of this Article, these vulnerabilities are outlined broadly and detailed 
specifically in the case of Alaskan indigenous communities. Part III dis-
cusses how the framing and construction of climate change in discourse 
impacts how relocation is articulated and viewed at the community level. 
Part IV focuses on the day-to-day discourse—the micropolitics—of cli-
mate change in Kivalina as the community negotiates its relocation. The 
evolution and articulation of the climate justice discourse and the impli-
cations of the 2008 lawsuit are explored in Part V. 
II. SOCIAL VULNERABILITY AMONG INDIGENOUS COMMUNITIES IN 
ALASKA  
Climate change, and its associated policies, can reveal and exacer-
bate social vulnerability, which is defined as a community’s sensitivity to 
environmental changes and its ability to respond and recover from their 
impacts.16 Social vulnerability has roots in social structures and settle-
ment and development patterns that affect a community’s access to re-
sources, power, information, and networks.17 Conversely, social vulnera-
bilities of people and societies shape the damages associated with storms, 
droughts, and slow-onset climatic changes.18 The interplay between cli-
mate change and vulnerability “involves the totality of relationships in a 
given social situation producing a set of conditions that render a society 
unable to absorb the impacts of a natural or social agent without signifi-
cant disruption of its capacity to fulfill the basic needs of its members.”19 
In other words, climate change may be “much more explainable in terms 
                                                        
 16. Susan L. Cutter & Christina Finch, Temporal and Spatial Changes in Social Vulnerability 
to Natural Hazards, 105 PROC. OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S. 2301, 2301 (2008). 
 17. See KATHY LYNN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., SOCIAL VULNERABILITY AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE: SYNTHESIS OF LITERATURE, GENERAL TECHNICAL REPORT PNW-GTR-838, at 8 (2011). 
 18. Jesse Ribot, Vulnerability Does Not Fall from the Sky: Toward Multiscale, Pro-Poor Cli-
mate Policy, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 47, 47 (Robin Mearns & Andrew Norton 
eds., 2010). 
 19 . Anthony Oliver-Smith, Climate Change and Population Displacement: Disasters and 
Diasporas in the Twenty-First Century, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: FROM 
ENCOUNTERS TO ACTIONS 116, 120 (Susan A. Crate & Mark Nuttall eds., 2009). 
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of . . . the conditions of inequality and subordination in the society rather 
than the accidental geophysical features of a place.”20 Community re-
sponses to climate change, therefore, are the result of complex relation-
ships between climate change and social vulnerabilities. 21  In Kivalina, 
community members expressed concerns about the ability to adapt in 
ways that sustain their livelihoods in a just, equitable manner. For 
Kivalina, and other indigenous communities who face climate-induced 
relocation, there is a need to address social vulnerability by increasing 
access to information and participation in policymaking; maintenance of 
local and traditional knowledge; and adaptive capacity.22 
The causes, consequences, and interconnection of climate change 
and social vulnerability among indigenous communities in Alaska are 
contextualized by environmental changes and extractive resource devel-
opment; limited authority and resources to adapt to climate-induced im-
pacts; socioeconomic and sociocultural stress; indigenous identity and 
knowledge; and subsistence livelihoods. 
A. Environmental Changes and Extractive Resource Development 
The 2005 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) concluded 
that “[i]f the scientific projections and scenarios are realized, climate 
change could have potentially devastating impacts on the Arctic and on 
the peoples who live there, particularly those indigenous peoples whose 
livelihoods and cultures are inextricably linked to the arctic environment 
and its wildlife.”23 Alaska has seen an increase in winter temperatures of 
three to four degrees Celsius over the past fifty years with a projected 
rise of another three to give degrees by the end of the century.24 This 
                                                        
 20. Id. 
 21. LYNN ET AL., supra note 17, at 8. Social vulnerability within indigenous populations is 
shaped by (1) equity and justice; (2) culture and knowledge; and (3) adaptive capacity. Id. at 7. Equi-
ty and justice include “access to and participation in the processes and outcomes of policymaking, as 
well as ethical and legal issues related to responsibility among governments and populations to ad-
dress climate change.” Id. Culture and knowledge include “the impact of climate change on current 
and future generations, local and traditional knowledge, sense of place, and treaty rights and access 
to traditional resources.” Id. Adaptive capacity refers to the “relative power among populations, 
ability to address climate effects, and access to social processes and resources.” Id. 
 22. Kyle Powys Whyte, Justice Forward: Tribes, Climate Adaptation and Responsibility, 120 
CLIMATIC CHANGE 517, 523–24 (2013). 
 23. ARCTIC COUNCIL & INT’L ARCTIC SCI. COMM., ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
659 (Carolyn Symon et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005), available at 
http://www.acia.uaf.edu/pages/scientific.html. 
 24 . JONATHAN M. HANNA, NATIVE COMMUNITIES AND CLIMATE CHANGE: PROTECTING 
TRIBAL RESOURCES AS PART OF NATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY 11 (Jonathan M. Hanna, ed. 2007), 
available at http://www.tribesandclimatechange.org/docs/tribes_116.pdf. 
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warming trend significantly impacts the extent and volume of Arctic sea 
ice. 
The December 2012 Arctic Report Card found Arctic sea-ice levels 
in September to be the lowest on record, with continual decreases in mul-
ti-year sea ice.25 Lack of summer sea ice raises development concerns, as 
areas for fossil fuel exploration and extraction change, and new shipping 
routes become available.26 While there is the potential for jobs and in-
creases in tax revenue from fossil fuel and mineral development,27 there 
is also the potential for increases in contamination, pollution, and envi-
ronmental degradation directly from exploration and extraction activities, 
as well as indirectly from the greenhouse gas emissions of fossil fuel 
combustion.28 
Warmer temperatures on land and sea also result in less shore ice, 
which leaves coastal villages more vulnerable to storm surges and floods. 
A 2003 U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report found that 184 
out of 213 (86% percent) Alaska native villages are becoming more sus-
ceptible to flooding and erosion due in part to rising temperatures.29 The 
report also found that four villages—Kivalina, Newtok, Koyukuk, and 
Shishmaref—“are in imminent danger from flooding and erosion” and 
will need to relocate.30 The Executive Subcabinet on Climate Change, 
established in 2007 by former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin, formed the 
Immediate Action Workgroup (IAW) to identify the immediate needs of 
communities imminently threatened by erosion, flooding, permafrost 
degradation, and other climate change-related impacts.31 The IAW iden-
tified communities, including Kivalina, in need of immediate assistance 
and facilitated meetings with community representatives to develop re-
sponse strategies.32 Based on IAW recommendations, the Alaska legisla-
ture established the Alaska Climate Change Impact Mitigation Program33 
                                                        
 25. See Arctic Report Card: Update for 2012, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., 
http://www.arctic.noaa.gov/report12/ (last visited June 10, 2014). 
 26. HANNA, supra note 24, at 11–12. 
 27. Oil and gas revenue comprised 92% of Alaska’s unrestricted revenue in fiscal year 2011. 
State Revenue, ALASKA OIL & GAS ASS’N, http://www.aoga.org/facts-and-figures/state-revenue/ 
(last visited June 10, 2014). 
 28. HANNA, supra note 24, at 11–14. 
 29. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-142, ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: MOST ARE 
AFFECTED BY FLOODING AND EROSION, BUT FEW QUALIFY FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 2–3 (2003) 
[hereinafter GAO 2003 REPORT]. 
 30. Id. at 4. 
 31. IMMEDIATE ACTION WORKGROUP, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNOR’S SUBCABINET 
ON CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2009), available at http://www.climatechange.alaska.gov/docs/iaw_finalrpt 
_12mar09.pdf. 
 32. Id. at 3–4.  
 33. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 195.040 (2009). 
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(ACCIMP) to “address the immediate planning needs of communities 
imminently threatened by the impacts of climate-related natural hazards 
such as erosion, flooding, storm surge, and thawing permafrost.”34 The 
ACCIMP permits the Commerce, Community, and Economic Develop-
ment Department to award, on a non-competitive basis, a grant of 
$10,000 to $50,000 to six eligible communities, including Kivalina, for a 
Hazard Impact Assessment (HIA) to identify climate change-related im-
pacts and recommend actions in response.35 Based on the HIA recom-
mendations, the department may award, on a competitive basis, grants of 
up to $150,000 per community for planning services.36 To date, none of 
the six communities have successfully relocated. 
In 2009, the Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) conducted the Alaska 
Baseline Erosion Assessment, which compared the cost of erosion con-
trol versus the cost of relocation, and found sizeable funding gaps.37 The 
assessment estimated infrastructure costs due to erosion over a twenty-
year period in Kivalina at $105 million; however, given the amount of 
current and projected erosion, the community may become uninhabitable 
over the next ten to fifteen years.38 The relocation of Kivalina is estimat-
ed to cost $123.4 million, but this amount may be too low because it 
would provide for only a minimal level of housing, water, and sanitation 
facilities.39 In addition, both federal and Alaskan post-disaster response 
statutes limit funding to restoration of infrastructure to its condition prior 
to the disaster, not to relocation efforts.40 Funding to address relocation is 
often unavailable to communities because they lack approved disaster 
mitigation plans, have not been declared a federal disaster area by the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), or are unincorporated 
villages in an unorganized borough and do not qualify for the U.S. De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Community De-
velopment Block Program.41 Furthermore, federal funds are designed to 
                                                        
 34 . See Alaska Climate Change Impact Mitigation Program, ALASKA DEP’T OF COM., 
COMMUNITY, & ECON. DEV., http://commerce.alaska.gov/dnn/dcra/PlanningLandManagement/ 
ACCIMP.aspx (last visited June 10, 2014). 
 35. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3 § 195.040(a) (2009). 
 36. Id. § 195.040(b). 
 37. See generally U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS ALASKA DIST., ALASKA BASELINE EROSION 
ASSESSMENT: AVETA REPORT SUMMARY—KIVALINA, ALASKA (2009), available at 
http://www.poa.usace.army.mil/Portals/34/docs/civilworks/BEA/Kivalina_Final%20Report.pdf. 
 38. See id. at 3. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See ALASKA STAT. § 26.23.010 (2008). 
 41. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-09-551, ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: LIMITED 
PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON RELOCATING VILLAGES THREATENED BY FLOODING AND EROSION 
20–24 (2009) [hereinafter GAO 2009 REPORT]. 
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supplement state and local resources for reconstruction in the current 
location, not to fully fund relocation.42 
To help address these statutory and financial gaps, the GAO rec-
ommended the following: a feasibility study of response alternatives to 
flooding and erosion; a policy to guide future infrastructure investments; 
a flood assessment conducted by ACE to augment their recent erosion 
assessment; grants for housing and community development; and the 
creation of a lead federal entity that could work with a lead state agency 
to help communities coordinate and oversee relocation efforts. 43  The 
2009 GAO follow-up report found that “no single comprehensive proac-
tive federal program to assist villages with their relocation efforts” ex-
ists.44 
These environmental changes in the Arctic increase the social vul-
nerability of indigenous communities in Alaska in a number of signifi-
cant ways: limited authority and resources to adequately adapt to climate 
change; socioeconomic and sociocultural stress; the maintenance of tra-
ditional knowledge; and the ability to practice a subsistence way of life.45 
B. Limited Authority and Resources 
For indigenous communities in Alaska, climate-induced relocation 
cannot be separated from the history of government-mandated relocation 
and land dispossession, which have hindered the application of tradition-
al knowledge to climate change adaptation.46 When Alaska became a 
state in 1959, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) divided village 
land into lots, determined a base price for each, and auctioned them off.47 
Because many indigenous people were either hunting or had little money 
or experience with auctions, many missed the auction and were dispos-
sessed, becoming “homeless in [their] homeland.”48 Most Alaskan terri-
tory was under federal jurisdiction, and Congress granted the new state 
government the right to select up to 104 million acres of federal land for 
                                                        
 42. Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Community Relocations: Creating an Adaptive Govern-
ance Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrine, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357, 365 
(2011). 
 43. See generally GAO 2009 REPORT, supra note 41; GAO 2003 REPORT, supra note 29. 
 44. GAO 2009 REPORT, supra note 41, at 20. 
 45. HANNA, supra note 24, at 11–14. 
 46. See Julie Koppel Maldonado et al., The Impact of Climate Change on Tribal Communities 
in the US: Displacement, Relocation, and Human Rights, 120 CLIMATIC CHANGE 601, 603 (2013). 
 47. See WILLIAM L. IĠĠIAĠRUK HENSLEY, FIFTY MILES FROM TOMORROW: A MEMOIR OF 
ALASKA AND THE REAL PEOPLE 109–10 (Sarah Crichton Books 2009). 
 48. Id. at 108. 
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state ownership.49 Consequently, land with the greatest potential for oil, 
gas, and mineral development fell under state control.50 In 1971, Con-
gress passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) that 
awarded forty-four million acres, approximately 16% of Alaska’s territo-
ry, and $962.5 million to Alaskan Natives for relinquishing claims to the 
rest.51 
Soon, however, it became clear that ANCSA was not the just transi-
tion to land sovereignty that Congress envisioned. ANCSA extinguished 
all claims of aboriginal title, including hunting and fishing rights, and 
replaced them with multiple regional corporations and the ability to es-
tablish village corporations, wholly owned by qualified Alaska natives 
(i.e., those born prior to December 18, 1971).52 William Hensley, Alas-
ka’s first Native state representative in Congress who also helped write 
ANCSA, admits in his memoir that in the attempt to “accommodate 
modernization,” ANCSA was responsible for crowding out “the con-
sciousness of our people’s heritage, purpose, and survival as a culture.”53 
The replacement of rights in land and resources with individual shares in 
corporations “can be seen as being driven by the policy of assimilation” 
that limits the ability of indigenous peoples to maintain their subsistence 
and cultural patterns as well as self-determination.54 Hensley states that 
“[r]ules were being made for us by people whose mandate was to change 
us by attacking the very essence of what made us unique: our languages, 
our names, our religion, our customs, and our values.”55 
During the forty years since ANCSA passed, James Anaya, the 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, 
was “struck by indications about how the economic and cultural trans-
formations accelerated by ANCSA have bred or exacerbated social ills 
among indigenous communities, manifesting themselves, for example, in 
high rates of suicide, alcoholism, and violence.”56 
                                                        
 49. Id. at 111. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 159. 
 52. See Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People, The Situation of Indigenous 
Peoples in the U.S., Hum. Rts. Council, ¶¶ 58–60, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/47/Add.1 (Aug. 30, 2012) 
(by James Anaya) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur]; Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 
U.S.C. §§ 1607–1608 (2012). 
 53. HENSLEY, supra note 47, at 214. 
 54. Special Rapporteur, supra note 52, ¶ 59. 
 55. HENSLEY, supra note 47, at 129. 
 56. Special Rapporteur, supra note 52, ¶ 62. 
2014] Conceptualizing Climate Justice in Kivalina 1189 
C. Socioeconomic and Sociocultural Stress 
Kivalina displays many of the “social ills” referred to by Special 
Rapporteur Anaya. Tribal Administrator Stanley Hawley mentioned that 
due to limited building space, there has been no new construction of 
homes in Kivalina, which leads to overcrowding.57 “People are paying 
the price” for the lack of developable land space, he said, referring to a 
three-room house occupied by seventeen people.58 The combination of 
overcrowding, unemployment, and inhibited ability to practice a subsist-
ence lifestyle creates tension within the community, which continues to 
experience cases of drug and alcohol abuse, sexual and domestic vio-
lence, suicides, and crime. For example, in October 2012, two teenagers 
were charged with burglary, theft, criminal mischief, and tampering with 
evidence when they broke into the Kivalina Native Store and stole 
$189,000.59 Incidents like these are compounded by a lack of adequate 
policing, health care, and other public services.60 These socioeconomic 
and sociocultural stressors characterize social vulnerability within the 
context of climate variability.61 
D. Indigenous Identity and Knowledge 
Indigenous knowledge, a rich source of observations of environ-
mental changes that goes back for millennia, plays an important role in 
climate change adaptation strategies and assessments. 62  Indigenous 
knowledge is defined generally as a “cumulative body of knowledge and 
beliefs, handed down through generations by cultural transmission, about 
the relationship of living beings (including humans) with one another and 
with their environment.”63  Indigenous knowledge is of particular im-
                                                        
 57. Interview with Stanley Hawley, Tribal Adm’r, Native Vill. of Kivalina IRA Council, in 
Kivalina, Alaska (Oct. 25, 2012). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Teens Charged in Theft of $189K at Kivalina Store, JUNEAU EMPIRE (Oct. 3, 2012), 
http://juneauempire.com/state/2012-10-03/teens-charged-theft-189k-kivalina-
store#.UMNcQJPjmQY. 
 60. E-mail from Stanley Hawley, Tribal Adm’r, Native Vill. of Kivalina IRA Council, to 
Marissa Knodel (Mar. 17, 2014) (on file with author). 
 61. Timothy J. Finan, Climate Science and the Policy of Drought Mitigation in Ceará, North-
east Brazil, in WEATHER, CLIMATE, AND CULTURE 203, 205 (Sarah Strauss & Benjamin S. Orlove 
eds., 2003). 
 62. See KRISTEN VINYETA & KATHY LYNN, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EXPLORING THE ROLE OF 
TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE IN CLIMATE CHANGE INITIATIVES, GENERAL TECHNICAL 
REPORT PNW-GTR-879, at 9 (2013); Henry Huntington & Shari Fox, The Changing Arctic: Indige-
nous Perspectives, in ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT 62, 62–95 (2005), available at 
http://www.acia.uaf.edu/PDFs/ACIA_Science_Chapters_Final/ACIA_Ch03_Final.pdf. 
 63. Matthew Lauer & Shankar Aswani, Indigenous Ecological Knowledge As Situated Practic-
es: Understanding Fishers’ Knowledge in the Western Solomon Islands, 111 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 
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portance to climate adaptation in the Arctic, where accelerated global 
warming makes weather conditions increasingly difficult to forecast and 
presents dangers to subsistence hunters.64 
Among the Iñupiaq,65 the northernmost group of aboriginal people 
that inhabit northwest Alaska and parts of northern Canada and Green-
land, the classroom is the environment of snow, ice, and ocean, and the 
teachers are the elements as well as community elders. Iñupiaq 
knowledge as it relates to the environment is informed by over 1,000 
years of experience and preserved in the form of oral tradition.66 The 
Iñupiaq language consists of a group of dialects and adaptive behaviors 
passed down from one generation to the next through stories that help 
transform practice and experience into memory.67 Generational inher-
itance of elders’ knowledge and experience depends upon “community-
based oral histor[ies]” and “land-based experiential learning” in order to 
pass on the knowledge and experience of elders through successive gen-
erations. 68  Joe Swan, a Kivalina elder, said that elders know people 
“learn through experience,”69 but that the younger generation is “spoiled” 
because they don’t want to hunt, get a job, or provide for their family, yet 
“survival is dependent on cultural heritage.” 70  Swan further stated, 
“There is no future survival unless there’s something you think and cre-
ate. These are not just old stories. The younger generation needs help to 
carry on Iñupiaq traditions because culture is going to change.”71 The 
cultural attitudes and values such as patience, persistence, calmness, re-
spect for elders, and respect for the environment embedded within tradi-
tional knowledge allow indigenous communities to remain resourceful 
and resilient in a changing world.72 
                                                                                                                            
317, 322 (2009) (quoting Fikret Birkes, Traditional Ecological Knowledge in Perspective, in 
TRADITIONAL ECOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE CONCEPTS AND CASES 3 (Julian T. Inglis, ed. 1993)). 
 64 . See DOUGLAS NAKASHIMA ET AL., WEATHERING UNCERTAINTY: TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE FOR CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENT AND ADAPTATION 35 (David McDonald ed., 
Stéphanie Ledauphin et al. trans., 2012), available at http://www.ipmpcc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/Weathering-Uncertainty_FINAL_12-6-2012.pdf. 
 65. Iñupiaq and Inuit tend to be used interchangeably, although Inuit usually refers to the peo-
ple living in Canada and Greenland. 
 66 . Anne Henshaw, Climate and Culture in the North: The Interface of Archaeology, 
Paleoenvironmental Science, and Oral History, in WEATHER, CLIMATE, AND CULTURE, supra note 
61, at 217, 226. 
 67. Id. at 220. 
 68. Id. at 226. 
 69. Interview with Joe Swan, in Kivalina, Alaska (Oct. 26, 2012). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See James Ford et al., Reducing Vulnerability to Climate Change in the Arctic: The Case of 
Nunavut, Canada, 60 ARCTIC 150, 158 (2007). 
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The recognition and incorporation of indigenous knowledge and 
ways of comprehending the environment, weather, and climate were is-
sues of contention between Alaska Natives and the U.S. government pri-
or to the prominence of climate change in the policy arena. When Alaska 
became a U.S. territory in 1867, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) sub-
sequently removed children from their homes to classrooms designed to 
sever any connection to their indigenous identity and culture.73 The use 
of native language was forbidden and continuously suppressed as native 
children were told “who they were was not good enough” and that “they 
should leave behind the world of their parents and grandparents and be-
come something different.”74 
Despite this assimilationist policy, the use of indigenous knowledge 
continues to demonstrate a “holistic understanding” of the environment 
that looks at how different components of an ecosystem relate.75 By em-
bedding this knowledge within the context of climate change, the resili-
ence of vulnerable indigenous communities may be strengthened. 
E. Subsistence Culture 
The Iñupiaq practice a subsistence lifestyle of hunting whale, cari-
bou, seal, walrus, polar bear, musk-ox, fish, and birds, which gives them 
an intimate understanding of the Arctic landscape and ocean. Climate 
change has the potential to adversely impact subsistence culture through 
limitations on the availability and abundance of species and the increased 
risk and difficulty of activities associated with subsistence living. 76 
Kivalina City Mayor Austin Swan said, “Climate change impacts our 
lifestyle. We have to go farther to get what we need, but we’re losing the 
sea ice.”77 In Kivalina, I was told the community has been unable to suc-
cessfully hunt whale since the mid-1990s,78 and caribou are becoming 
scarcer.79 Further, a drought in June and July of 2012 was followed by 
heavy rain in August, which decimated the berry harvest.80 
For many indigenous communities in Alaska, subsistence culture is 
about more than sustenance; it is about the process of sharing and reaf-
firming “fundamental values and attitudes towards animals and the envi-
ronment and provides[s] a moral foundation for continuity between gen-
                                                        
 73. See HENSLEY, supra note 47, at 72. 
 74. Id. at 78. 
 75. See Henshaw, supra note 66, at 218–19. 
 76. See HANNA, supra note 24, at 11. 
 77. Interview with Austin Swan, Mayor, City of Kivalina, in Kivalina, Alaska (Oct. 26, 2012). 
 78. Interview with Lucy Adams, supra note 2. 
 79. Interview with Stanley Hawley, supra note 57. 
 80. Interview with Lucy Adams, supra note 2. 
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erations.”81 In the words of Joe Swan: “No food, no future. Period.”82 
Even though many indigenous communities in Alaska practice only a 
partially subsistence lifestyle, commentators suggest that such a close 
connection to ecosystem goods and services allow these communities to 
“interpret and react to climate change impacts in creative ways, drawing 
on traditional knowledge as well as new technologies to find solutions, 
which may help society at large to cope with the impending changes.”83 
Climate change undermines the foundation for indigenous 
worldviews, which are “embedded in a holistic framework that connects 
the land to the air and water, the earth to the sky, the plants to the ani-
mals, the people to the spirit.”84 For indigenous peoples, “climate change 
is not something that comes in isolation; it magnifies already existing 
problems of poverty, deterritoriality, marginalization, and noninclusion 
in national and international policy-making processes and discourses.”85 
In sum, climate change both causes and exacerbates the inability of in-
digenous communities in Alaska to practice a subsistence way of life and 
maintain their traditional knowledge in a place of health and safety, 
which undermines their land and cultural sovereignty in an already con-
tested landscape. Given that climate-induced vulnerabilities have led 
several indigenous communities in Alaska to plan for community reloca-
tion, it is important to understand how relocation as a climate adaptation 
strategy is viewed within the climate change discourse. 
III. RELOCATION WITHIN THE CLIMATE CHANGE DISCOURSE 
Environmental disasters and the people they impact are constructed 
and framed by social, economic, and political factors, which provide a 
theoretical basis for the assertion that “we construct our own disasters 
insofar as disasters occur in the environments that we produce.”86 Simi-
larly, the impacts of climate change are “socially, politically, and eco-
nomically mediated, distributed, and interpreted, with measures to miti-
                                                        
 81. HANNA, supra note 24, at 11 (citing ARCTIC COUNCIL & INT’L ARCTIC SCI. COMM., supra 
note 23). 
 82. Interview with Joe Swan, supra note 69. 
 83. VINYETA & LYNN, supra note 62, at 9 (citing Jan Salick & Nanci Ross, Traditional Peo-
ples and Climate Change, 19 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 138 (2009)). 
 84. Patricia Cochran et al., Indigenous Frameworks for Observing and Responding to Climate 
Change in Alaska, 120 CLIMATIC CHANGE 557, 559 (2013); Susan A. Crate & Mark Nuttall, Intro-
duction: Anthropology and Climate Change, in ANTHROPOLOGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE: FROM 
ENCOUNTERS TO ACTIONS 12 (Susan A. Crate & Mark Nuttall eds., 2009). 
 85. Crate & Nuttall, supra note 84, at 11. 
 86. Anthony Oliver-Smith, Theorizing Disasters: Nature, Power, and Culture, in CATAS-
TROPHE AND CULTURE: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF DISASTER 23, 43 (Susanna M. Hoffman & Antho-
ny Oliver-Smith eds., 2002). 
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gate and respond similarly structured.”87 Climate change is both a “narra-
tive” and “material phenomenon” such that its meanings and conse-
quences are shaped by particular cultural values and practices of particu-
lar groups of people in particular places.88 Climate change may also be 
characterized as a “moving target” because the “media portrayal of cli-
mate change, the excessive dramatizing of apocalyptic events, or the 
downplaying of scientific evidence and the critique of scientific mo-
tive . . . have significance for how climate change is defined, understood, 
and legitimated.”89 
The climate change discourse emerging from international devel-
opment agencies, research institutions, NGOs, consultancies, and inves-
tigative journalism position climate-vulnerable populations as both vic-
tims and evidence of the climate crisis, which changes the way local 
events are framed and understood.90 People who are forced or who vol-
untarily move in response to climate change “appear as subjects who 
seem to speak directly for the climate” and become a visible entity by 
which the public can engage with the climate change discourse.91 Dis-
courses that describe climate change “refugees” are “actively and contin-
ually negotiated as part of their production” and, “like any representa-
tions, are neither static nor innocent. . . . [T]hey are vehicles for power, 
characterised [sic] by fluid, ongoing claims of inclusion and exclusion, 
dependent on the interests of those engaged in them.”92 Hence, in discus-
sions about climate-induced relocation, characterizing the community as 
victims versus empowered agents changes the nature of the discourse 
from disasters to resiliency. 
The nature of the climate change and refugee discourses impact 
how relocation is articulated and viewed at the community level. One 
perspective views displacement and resettlement as “second disasters” 
following environmental and climatic changes.93 Oliver-Smith writes that 
the “uprooting of livelihood and community” implies a loss of individual 
and social identity tied to a particular environment; thus, relocation re-
quires a reinvention of self and community that has both “material and 
                                                        
 87. Oliver-Smith, Climate Change and Population Displacement, supra note 19, at 120. 
 88. See Carol Farbotko & Heather Lazrus, The First Climate Refugees? Contesting Global 
Narratives of Climate Change in Tuvalu, 22 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 382, 382 (2012). 
 89. Crate & Nuttall, supra note 84, at 11. 
 90. See Farbotko & Lazrus, supra note 88, at 382; Kay Milton, Anthropological Perspectives 
on Climate Change: Introduction, 19 AUSTL. J. ANTHROPOLOGY 57, 57–58 (2008); Durrer, supra 
note 6, at 18. 
 91. Farbotko & Lazrus, supra note 88, at 385. 
 92. Id. at 383. 
 93. Oliver-Smith, Climate Change and Population Displacement, supra note 19, at 122. 
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social aspects,” the resources for which are often diminished during the 
relocation process:94 
[L]osses of community, family, and self compound each other to 
create a cumulative loss of meaning. . . . They challenge the cultur-
ally constructed vision where the world is a place imbued with logic 
and life makes sense, even if it can be unfair. Major disasters rob 
people of the social context in which they live meaningful lives that 
are considered significant by others. This loss of personal relation-
ships and the social context in which they were expressed and in 
which the individual was affirmed may leave people bereft of a 
sense of meaning and purpose in life.95 
An alternative perspective is to view relocation as an adaptation 
strategy that builds resiliency. If the impacts of relocation on communi-
ties result in the negative consequences listed above, then moving in an-
ticipation of climate change may precipitate and minimize its social and 
political costs by allowing adequate time for community consultation and 
planning.96 Researchers Carol Farbotko and Heather Lazrus discuss how 
in Tuvalu, an island in the South Pacific, migration in response to climate 
change threats can be considered a source of economic and social 
strength because of its long-term approach to climate change adapta-
tion.97 They conclude by advocating for the incorporation of “cultural 
values, national identity, ongoing practices of migration and change, 
sovereignty, and compensation”98 into the climate change adaptation dis-
course and that relocation as an adaptation strategy must address “equity, 
identity[,] and human rights.”99 As discussed in the next Part, the reloca-
tion discussion that began in the late 1960s has evolved from a debate 
over developable space between Kivalina and the state of Alaska to in-
clude climate adaptation and other institutions. For relocation to be seen 
as a strategy to build resilience, significant changes must be made to en-
gage the community to collectively address all of Kivalina’s social and 
environmental vulnerabilities. 
                                                        
 94. Id. at 122–123. 
 95. Id. at 123. 
 96. See Jon Barnett & Michael Webber, Migration As Adaptation: Opportunities and Limits, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 37, 53 (Jane McAdam 
ed., 2010). 
 97. Farbotko & Lazrus, supra note 88, at 388. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See id. at 383, 388. 
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IV. CLIMATE CHANGE MICROPOLITICS IN KIVALINA  
Climate change micropolitics examines the term “climate change” 
through the day-to-day discourse of communities, which has the potential 
to foster new opportunities for collaboration, resistance, or both. Profes-
sor Tania Murray Li defines “micro political economy” as “day-to-day 
discourse and practice through which people seek to gain or defend ac-
cess to land, labour [sic] and other productive resources.” 100 
Micropolitics emphasizes human agency and focuses on the “creative 
ways in which cultural ideas are adapted to meet new conditions, and 
culturally informed practices, in turn, structure daily life and shape and 
reshape institutions at various levels.”101 This process of transformation 
involves the “contestation and revision of meanings of key terms”102 
through “[a]ction and inaction, speech and silence, compliance and re-
sistance.”103 
For example, a group of five professors studied the words used to 
describe climate change and its environmental impacts between two Af-
rican-American communities in the Chesapeake Bay Region to see how 
they influenced expressions of adaptation options.104 They found that 
instead of a scientific understanding of the linkages between greenhouse 
gas emissions and global warming, most people had “robust and varied 
understandings of climate change”105 based primarily on local experienc-
es and media sources.106 When it came to adaptation responses, the two 
communities expressed consciousness of the influence of power and 
money in terms of support to prepare for climate change, but they dif-
fered when it came to how to prepare, due primarily to differences in 
their physical location and level of risk exposure to flooding.107  The 
study concluded that it is essential to better understand how climate 
change becomes situated in communities that face different risks and 
social vulnerabilities and that adaptation will ultimately be “site specific” 
and “a human endeavor of social relationships with exchanges of infor-
                                                        
 100. Tania Murray Li, Images of Community: Discourse and Strategy in Property Relations, 
27 DEV. & CHANGE 501, 509 (1996). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 510–511. 
 104. See generally Michael Paolisso et al., Climate Change, Justice and Adaptation Among 
African American Communities in the Chesapeake Bay Region, 4 WEATHER, CLIMATE, & SOC’Y 34 
(2012). 
 105. Id. at 42. 
 106. See id. at 42–44. 
 107. Id. at 45. 
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mation and resources.”108 In sum, climate change simultaneously fosters 
diverse meanings and offers the potential for collaboration by a variety 
of social groups at the local level.109 
The micropolitics of climate change demonstrate that communities 
are not passive players with predictable reactions to a changing environ-
ment. Rather, community responses will be determined by “endogenous 
factors that vary considerably from location to location, reflecting varia-
tions in culture, economy, social history, and land-use practices.”110 The 
micropolitics of climate change in Kivalina reveal a community well 
aware of the need to relocate, but unable to do so due to geographical, 
financial, and political factors beyond their control or influence. 
A. Geographical Factors 
The barrier island where Kivalina is now located used to be a sea-
sonal hunting ground. However, in 1905 the BIA built a school there and 
ordered parents to enroll their children or face imprisonment.111 The is-
land’s location between the Chukchi Sea and Kivalina lagoon make it 
susceptible to natural hazards such as storms, flooding, erosion, melting 
permafrost, and sea-level rise.112 This location also limits adaptation re-
sponses because there is no land area to expand, no water distribution, 
sewer, or waste disposal systems, and only one and a half miles of un-
maintained trails for transportation.113 The later formation of sea ice, 
which normally provides a buffer, has accelerated erosion of the island in 
recent years and increased impacts from storms. 114  The governor of 
Alaska and FEMA declared Kivalina a disaster area in 2002, 2004, and 
2005.115 The state of Alaska again declared Kivalina a disaster emergen-
cy in September 2012 when record rainfall raised the water level of the 
Kivalina and Wulik rivers and flooded the village landfill. 116 The flood-
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ing damaged water transmission lines before the city could refill the wa-
ter tanks, resulting in a high reported incidence of dehydration among 
elders and infants.117 Due to financial and statutory limitations that are 
detailed below, erosion control projects were largely unsuccessful and 
only temporary solutions to ongoing climatic changes. 
B. Financial Factors 
In response to the violent storms in 2005, the Northwest Arctic 
Borough attempted to build a seawall using Hesco Concertainers—wire 
mesh baskets filled with sand and gravel—that villagers were told had 
been used successfully in other parts of the state to control erosion.118 
However, because there was no scoping meeting and the Concertainers 
were filled with sand and gravel from Kivalina’s beaches, the opposite 
occurred.119 The day before the ceremony to celebrate the wall’s comple-
tion in October 2006, a storm pulled the sand from underneath the bas-
kets and completely dismantled the multi-million dollar project.120 
In 2005, Congress passed § 117 of the Consolidated Appropriations 
Act, which granted federal funds for ACE to conduct storm damage pro-
tection projects for Alaska Native villages.121 As a temporary protection 
measure, ACE approved construction of a rock revetment project de-
signed to be 3,200 feet long and encase the entire island. Funding was 
only secured, however, for 1,600 feet on the seaside of the island.122 All 
construction stopped in 2009 when § 117 was rescinded.123 Funding au-
thorization was replaced in October 2009, but only provided a 35% 
match of non-federal funds and did not appropriate any funds for Alaska 
erosion control or relocation projects.124 
C. Political Factors 
With ACE and others forecasting increasing storms and erosion, no 
room for settlement expansion, and limited fortification options, Kivalina 
residents know that relocation is inevitable. In fact, the village first voted 
                                                        
 117. E-mail from Stanley Hawley, supra note 60. 
 118. Kivalina Consensus Building Project, supra note 112, at 15–16. 
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to relocate in 1992 and formed a Relocation Planning Committee.125 In 
2000, a special election to select a relocation site was held, and Kivalina 
residents overwhelming chose Kiniktuuraq, located seven and a half 
miles southeast of the village that has long been used as a camping 
ground during hunting trips.126 When ACE released its 2006 Kivalina 
Relocation Master Plan, it declared Kiniktuuraq was “geotechnically 
inappropriate and strategically problematic” because the site is a flood-
plain with ice rich soil that would need to be replaced with twelve feet of 
gravel.127 Kivalina elders and other community members disputed this 
conclusion and argued that when it flooded in Kivalina, there was no 
flooding in Kiniktuuraq because it was located at a slightly higher eleva-
tion.128 Instead of offering the community a vote to select an alternative 
site, the ACE recommended the Imnaaquq Bluffs or Tatchim Isau in-
stead, both of which were unacceptable to the community because they 
would be too expensive and inconvenient to continue their subsistence 
lifestyle.129 
Disagreement over the relocation site illustrates the challenge of in-
tegrating indigenous and scientific knowledge. Indigenous knowledge 
often lacks the systematic and quantitative measurements and data col-
lection on which scientific knowledge relies, while scientific knowledge 
often fails to include locally appropriate variables and parameters.130 
Both indigenous communities and scientific researchers stand to benefit, 
however, from respectful collaboration. Scientific researchers acquire a 
better understanding of indigenous values and local expertise, while in-
digenous communities gain a better understanding of climate change and 
technologies for coping with its impacts.131 Climate change adaptation 
strategies, such as relocation, should be based on the best available 
knowledge that comes from constructive dialogues and co-production of 
new knowledge between indigenous peoples, scientists, and policymak-
ers.132 Knowledge co-production that includes traditional knowledge for 
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adaptation as well as indigenous processes, techniques, and tactics of 
developing, sustaining, and refreshing such knowledge is fundamental 
for research and projects that strive to integrate traditional and scientific 
knowledge.133 
Co-learning and co-production of knowledge do not, however, 
guarantee fairness or understanding, or address power asymmetries.134 
When indigenous communities are asked to share their traditional 
knowledge, safeguards provided through free, prior, and informed con-
sent procedures should be invoked to ensure the provision of all appro-
priate information necessary to make an informed decision.135 Because 
indigenous knowledge embodies the identities, histories, legacies, and 
responsibilities for generations that comprise what remains of indigenous 
cultures, it ought to be researched and utilized for the purpose of self-
determination in lieu of commercialization or exploitation.136 
In order to help resolve the conflict between Kivalina and federal 
agencies over the relocation site, the Kivalina Consensus Building Pro-
ject was launched.137 The project lasted from September 2009 to July 
2010, and involved door-to-door surveys, meetings, and workshops be-
tween community members and state and federal officials. During these 
negotiations, community leaders asked whether “it was . . . the federal 
government’s responsibility to relocate Kivalina” and often expressed 
frustration, mistrust, and “battle fatigue” from years of discourage-
ment.138 State and federal officials noted that the lack of progress towards 
relocation and the continuing threat of natural hazards have serious im-
plications for the mental health of the community. Many community 
members expressed a sense of hopelessness.139 In reference to communi-
ty attitudes to relocation, one environmental coordinator said, 
It’s like they are stuck here and it feels that way. We need to some-
how build their dreams again, we need to somehow give them a vi-
sion again, some kind of hope again, that thing[s] will get better, 
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that here will be water and sewer, that there will be places to build 
for the children and grandchildren.140 
By the end of the project, participants reached consensus on five main 
conclusions: 
1. Relocation efforts have been blocked thus far and need to be 
reconsidered with the local village government in the lead, 
along with collaboration with state and federal agencies; 
2. Hope must be created and maintained; 
3. There is a need to further address communication difficulties 
between stakeholders; 
4. The relocation process requires participation and consensus 
among all stakeholders; and 
5. Relocation policies must incorporate ongoing climatic chang-
es.141 
 
As of 2012, Kivalina has prepared Community Evacuation and 
Emergency Operations plans, and ACE and Kivalina are finally in 
agreement on a potential terminal site for an evacuation route in case of 
emergency, located on a hill five miles inland called Kisimigiuktuk.142 
Kivalina’s village government and its contractor, WH Pacific, are work-
ing with the BIA-Anchorage and the Maniilaq Corporation—a native 
non-profit organization that provides social and health services to twelve 
federally recognized tribes in the Northwest Arctic Borough—to try and 
secure funding for the evacuation route.143 When asked about a commu-
nity relocation plan, Stanley Hawley called the idea a “dead horse.”144 
Frustration with the lack of progress, resources, and attention given to 
Kivalina’s relocation by state and federal agencies instigated the 2008 
lawsuit that entered the community into the climate justice discourse, 
discussed in the following Part. 
V. CLIMATE JUSTICE DISCOURSE IN KIVALINA 
Climate change is a global phenomenon that has and will continue 
to affect every person on the planet, though with disparate impacts. The-
se disparities are disproportionately felt by the people who are the most 
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poor, vulnerable, and unable to react, adapt, and plan for climatic chang-
es. Because climate change impacts are ultimately experienced at the 
local level, they are difficult for policymakers to address because issues 
of justice, equity, and inequality create different vulnerabilities.145 The 
interconnection between climate change and social vulnerabilities leads 
to questions about blame for the causes of climate change, responsibility 
for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and help for communities to pre-
pare for and adapt to the inevitable effects.146 When climate change adap-
tation strategies turn to relocation, contentious questions about where to 
relocate—how, who should be involved, and who should pay—are 
raised. The fact that communities like Kivalina have contributed little to 
causing climate change but are limited in their ability to adapt to its con-
sequences speaks to injustice. Inadequate governance mechanisms and 
budgets to address climate-induced relocation and support adaptation 
strategies “may cause loss of community and culture, health impacts, and 
economic decline, further exacerbating tribal impoverishment and injus-
tice.”147 In this light, relocation as a climate adaptation strategy “repre-
sents several formal and retrospective layers of injustice” against indige-
nous communities because they “cannot escape having to deal with prob-
lems they largely did not bring about[,] and there are no obvious institu-
tional options that avoid substantial tradeoffs.”148 
A. Evolution of the Climate Justice Discourse 
Climate injustice is “the idea that harm from the deleterious effects 
of climate change, and the production and materialist processes associat-
ed with it, is unevenly distributed and deliberately falls disproportionate-
ly on the marginalized and the disadvantaged.”149 Climate justice, there-
fore, holds that because the richest most developed nations have contrib-
uted the most to causing climate change, they have a greater obligation to 
take immediate action.150 Central to this assignment of responsibility are 
the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibility, 
which are included in the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
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Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC was created in 1992 for the purpose 
of “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a 
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system” and concluded that developed countries should “take the 
lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof” and 
provide new and additional resources, both financial and technical, to 
developing countries to help implement the Convention.151 During the 
twenty years since the UNFCCC was agreed to by the community of na-
tions, minimal progress toward its stated goal has been achieved; in fact, 
a significant gap exists between country pledges to mitigate greenhouse 
gas emissions and the chance of holding global average temperature be-
low 2°C above preindustrial levels—the threshold beyond which very 
serious and irreversible consequences that threaten life, sovereignty, and 
societal sustainability will occur.152 The lack of progress in the face of an 
increasing number of adverse climatic changes has sparked climate jus-
tice debates that go beyond the distributional aspects of climate change 
impacts, responsibilities, and costs, to the instruments created to deal 
with these aspects and the processes by which they are developed and 
implemented. 
B. Articulations of Climate Justice 
The theory of articulation seeks to understand “how ideological el-
ements come, under certain conditions, to cohere together within a dis-
course” and “how they do or do not become articulated, at specific con-
junctures, to certain political subjects.”153 In other words, the theory of 
articulation asks how an ideology “discovers” its subject and “empow-
ers” it to make sense of its situation.154 For example, Professor Li argues 
that a group’s self-identification as tribal or indigenous is not something 
natural or inevitable, but neither is it invented, adopted, or imposed.155 
Rather, it is a “positioning” that emerges from patterns of global–local 
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engagements that create new boundaries as well as connection.156 An 
articulation, therefore, is a linkage that is “not necessary, determined, 
absolute and essential for all time,” but given different form and meaning 
depending on how it is articulated in a particular context.157 
The variety of linkages that exist between climate change and other 
environmental, social, political, and economic issues contribute to the 
articulation of climate justice. At the 2002 Earth Summit in Johannes-
burg, South Africa, a coalition of organizations called the International 
Climate Justice Network158 produced the “Principles of Climate Justice,” 
which seek to redefine climate change from a human rights and envi-
ronmental justice perspective. These principles were largely based on the 
“Environmental Justice Principles” prepared by the People of Color En-
vironmental Justice Leadership Summit in Washington, D.C. in 1991, 
which require “democratic decision making, community empowerment, 
and the incorporation of social culture” in environmental decision-
making processes, with the most important concept being “community 
self-determination.”159 The Environmental Justice and Climate Change 
Initiative (EJCC), a coalition of climate and environmental justice, poli-
cy, religious, and advocacy organizations in the United States, defines 
climate justice as “the fair treatment of all people and freedom from dis-
crimination with the creation of policies and projects that address climate 
change and the systems that create climate change and perpetuate dis-
crimination.”160 In sum, the climate justice movement binds together lib-
eration and economic and ideological sovereignty not by one uniform 
belief or message, but by the common belief that present systems and 
processes of decision making are insufficient to resolve the crisis of cli-
mate change, and other paths are both necessary and possible.161 Key to 
fair treatment is equitable representation and participation of vulnerable 
communities in the development and implementation of strategies to im-
prove their resiliency. Climate justice strategies should therefore consid-
er “how the people most vulnerable to climate change are involved in the 
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development of policies, the language used to address them, and, ulti-
mately, how they are affected by the outputs and outcomes of climate 
policies and plans.”162 
C. The Articulation of Climate Justice in Kivalina 
The frustrating lack of support and action in the midst of an eroding 
island prompted Kivalina to examine other alternatives for gaining voice 
and funds for relocation. In 2008, Kivalina filed suit in the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California against two dozen oil, coal, 
and power companies, including Exxon Mobil Corp., BP America, Duke 
Energy Corp., and Shell Oil Co., for public and private nuisance, as well 
as conspiracy and concert of action. 163  The complaint asserted these 
companies emitted greenhouse gases they knew contributed to the global 
warming that has melted the sea ice surrounding the village, leaving the 
residents there vulnerable to storms and erosion that will force the village 
to relocate.164 Kivalina sought money damages to assist with relocation 
and other adaptation measures.165 The court granted the companies’ mo-
tion to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction over the common law nui-
sance claim, which is based on U.S. federal law (the remaining claims 
relied on state law). The court declared that Kivalina lacked standing 
because “there is no realistic possibility of tracing any particular alleged 
effect of global warming to any particular emissions by any specific per-
son, entity, group at any particular point in time.”166 The court also de-
termined that resolution of the nuisance claim would require the Judicial 
Branch to make a policy determination concerning appropriate limits on 
greenhouse gas emissions and who should bear the cost of global warm-
ing, which are political questions better left to the Legislative or Execu-
tive Branches of government.167 The court dismissed the state law-based 
claims without prejudice, which means that Kivalina may re-file the case 
in Alaska state court.168 Kivalina appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s deci-
sion.169 The Ninth Circuit, however, chose a different theory on which to 
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dismiss the case. Relying on the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Ameri-
can Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 170  the Court declared that 
Kivalina’s public nuisance claim was not justiciable because the Clean 
Air Act, which directly addresses domestic greenhouse gas emissions 
from stationary sources, had displaced it.171 According to the Ninth Cir-
cuit, the fact that Kivalina was seeking damages and not emissions re-
ductions made no difference to the doctrine of displacement. 172  The 
Ninth Circuit concluded that while it is aware its decision does not aid 
Kivalina, “which itself is being displaced by the rising sea,” the solution 
to the village’s situation rests with the Legislative and Executive Branch-
es of government.173 While both the lawyers and supportive villagers ex-
pressed doubts that the lawsuit would ultimately be successful, they saw 
value in the attention that would be gained to their situation and cause.174 
Researcher Elizabeth Marino points out that Kivalina’s lawsuit may be 
an attempt to “gain, not just state and federal money towards relocation, 
but to regain control over movement of people over traditional lands; an 
effort . . . to reinvent the power relationship between Native villages and 
government.”175 
The articulation of climate justice in Kivalina reflects the struggle 
to maintain their subsistence culture in a place of their choosing. Enoch 
Adams, a Kivalina community member, noted the power dynamics in-
volved in the relocation process as part of a history of injustice and ine-
quality: 
The federal government has a trust responsibility to the tribes, and 
they need to enact that. The state of Alaska needs to pony up mon-
ies that they have been taking by getting resources from our land, 
and share it with the communities that need it the most. When you 
take a real close look at this, this is a human rights issue. There is 
racism involved. There is class warfare.176 
Do legal actions like the Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. 
lawsuits promote a “shared fairness” that take the principles of responsi-
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bility based on equity, empowerment through participation, and a recon-
figuration of power dynamics into account?177 Voices at the community 
level are mixed. Some expressed support for the lawsuit because it raised 
their voice in the call for attention to the responsibility fossil fuel compa-
nies and energy utilities bear for contributing to climate change.178 Oth-
ers viewed the lawsuit as a waste of resources that attracted negative at-
tention to the village and limited the willingness of outside entities to 
fund the relocation effort.179 Regardless of the legal outcome, the lawsuit 
served as an intervention that created a new, though confrontational, 
space for dialogue about relocation as a climate justice issue from the 
perspective of a small Native village in Alaska. What remains to be seen 
is whether this intervention also created new opportunities for collabora-
tive action and community participation to advance the relocation effort 
in a just and equitable manner. Thus, climate justice for Kivalina is both 
an ideological discourse about responsibility and a political struggle for 
equal participation, sovereignty, and cultural survival. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The impacts of climate change place stress on the people, practices, 
and institutions responsible for the adaptive capacity and resilience of a 
community.180 The indigenous peoples of the Arctic have been living and 
adapting to environmental changes for centuries and are not ignorant of 
the increasing pace of change.181 As climate change drives the relocation 
of several indigenous communities in Alaska, strong emphasis has been 
placed on finding ways to adapt that create resilient communities in new 
locations. However, state action and community involvement in cases of 
relocation cannot be divorced from environmental and social vulnerabili-
ties. Even though indigenous communities in Alaska are able to observe 
climate change, understand its ecological and societal consequences,182 
and develop potential response strategies,183 the limited choices and re-
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sources community members have available increases the likelihood that 
relocation will produce negative consequences.184 In other words, the 
struggles of the past shape discussions of the future.185 
When the inevitable prospect of community relocation enters the 
climate change discourse, the dominant image that arises is the climate 
change “refugee”—a victim of the climate crisis forced to adapt in ways 
that may lead to loss of home, identity, and certain cultural practices. 
This perspective is not without merit, because climate change exacer-
bates many existing vulnerabilities that persist due to Kivalina’s location 
on a barrier island, subsistence lifestyle, and related socioeconomic and 
sociocultural stressors. Communities like Kivalina that have limited ac-
cess to information, resources, power, and networks can benefit from the 
visibility such public attention produces.186 However, playing the role of 
the climate victim risks the loss of community voice and agency within 
this dominant discourse. The articulation of climate change and reloca-
tion as a climate justice issue may present a contradiction in intent and 
outcome as Kivalina’s vulnerability and victimization are emphasized 
within a discourse driven largely by discussions at international climate 
change negotiations and among outside interest groups. Whether the law-
suit pushes new boundaries for collaboration and resistance with state 
and federal agencies for relocation assistance remains to be seen. 
An alternative perspective is to view relocation as an opportunity to 
build resilience and address contentious issues such as responsibility for 
the drivers of climate change, allocation of resources to help with reloca-
tion, and justice in terms of equal participation, sovereignty, and mainte-
nance of cultural identity during the relocation process. The complexity 
of the causes, consequences, and processes to address climate-induced 
relocation requires a more comprehensive and open-ended approach to 
migration planning and decision making so that mobility may be seen as 
part of the solution rather than the problem.187 By recognizing and ad-
dressing the contextual elements that interconnect climate change and 
social vulnerability, Kivalina can improve its adaptive capacity and fos-
ter resilience. For example, relocation may provide both increased secu-
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rity from natural hazards and opportunities to improve housing, energy, 
water, sewer, and waste systems.188 
The key question for Kivalina in the near future is how to incorpo-
rate participation into the relocation process with a discourse sensitive to 
indigenous conceptions of terms that carry meaning within their specific 
historical, political, and cultural contexts.189 A participatory approach to 
relocation would take the community perspective into account by placing 
local, traditional knowledge on an equal footing with foreign—
particularly scientific—expertise, as well as include free, prior, and in-
formed consent procedures. 190  An adaptive governance framework to 
implement the relocation policy would include planning and funding for 
relocation; creating institutional leadership to facilitate dialogue between 
scientists, community leaders, policymakers, and government representa-
tives; authenticating the local government’s role as a leader and decision 
maker in the relocation process; and establishing an operational plan that 
provides for staffing, capacity building, agency coordination, health 
monitoring, and information dissemination within an urgent and realistic 
timeline.191 Colleen Swan told me that “we need recognition that our tra-
ditional ways are still alive.”192 Future research into the evolving climate 
change and justice discourses and actions taken to relocate the communi-
ty should ensure local participation by taking their situated knowledge 
and experiences into account and making the process of relocation their 
own. There is still community resilience of the kind Lucy Adams spoke; 
one has only to see Kivalina through the eyes of the people who call it 
home. 
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